Amazon Reportedly Acquires Siri-Like Evi App

Techcrunch:

When Siri arrived on the iPhone 4S it seemed like a magic piece of software. The future had arrived. But it wasn’t alone. True Knowledge, a British startup with a natural language search engine developed in university labs, had been working out what to do next. Siri was the ‘boom’ moment. They licensed Nuance’s voice recognition technology and created an app based on the True Knowledge engine, called Evi, which worked on any iPhone and Android.

That clever move looks like it paid off. TechCrunch understands from sources that the company has been sold to Amazon for $26 million. However, calls to Amazon PR, backers Octopus Ventures and the founders of Evi have ben met with a stoney silence. A spokesperson for Octopus told us: “On this occasion Octopus will decline to comment on this specific portfolio company.”

Evi is the potential front-end for Ivona, a speech-recognition company Amazon bought in January.

Amazon today announced that it is acquiring Ivona Software, a Polish-based specialist in voice technologies that competes with Nuance and is already used in the Kindle Fire for services covering text-to-speech, voice commands and “Explore by Touch.” The terms of the deal were not disclosed.

I was more impressed than most with the original Kindle Fire. Not because the hardware was good – it wasn’t – or because the software was great – it wasn’t either. Rather, the absolute seamlessness with which on device content was integreated with both cloud-based content AND content to buy or rent was amazing.

Buying stuff is fun, especially when the transaction is as painless as Amazon makes it. And buying stuff on the Fire has been fun since day one.

Still, all of that buying was digital; a Fire phone brings the Amazon purchase experience literally everywhere.

Remember when Amazon was incenting shoppers to use their price-checker app?

Today, December 10th, Amazon is offering a very special deal you’re going to love and your local brick-and-mortar retailer is going to hate. Use its PriceCheck mobile app and get 5% off your purchase, up to $5 at a time, as many as 3 times. Why the discounts to use PriceCheck? The app is designed to get you to visit local shops, try out a product, submit valuable pricing data to Amazon, leave without buying anything, and make your purchase on Amazon instead.

Imagine such functionality accessible with a dedicated button. Instant gratification, with nothing more than a bar code and your Amazon Fire phone. Or even better, nothing more than simply saying:

“Evi, buy me a toaster.”

Apple the Black Swan

Apple does everything wrong. They don’t do market research. They don’t segment the market with multiple models. They don’t have promotions. They don’t diversify. They don’t have divisions. They don’t have multiple P&Ls. They don’t pursue market share above all else. They don’t take on debt.1 They don’t pay dividends (or big enough ones, now). They don’t buy back their stock.2

They don’t make sense, especially to Wall Street (where today AAPL was pummeled yet again).

I believe the market thinks of Apple as a Black Swan: their success is so inexplicable, wrong even, that they simply have no idea how to value the company – in fact, they don’t even try.


The idea of a Black Swan was coined and popularized by Nassim Taleb, who defined a Black Swan as follows:

A Black Swan (and capitalize it) is an event with the following three attributes.

First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable.

The most well-known example is the 2008 financial crash. Financial models didn’t account for the possibility, the impact was absolutely massive, and everyone today has a pet theory as to why it happened. In fact, it was the financial crash that truly made The Black Swan theory famous — and Taleb rich:

Mr. Taleb last year published “The Black Swan,” a best-selling book about the impact of extreme events on the world and the financial markets. He also helped start a hedge fund, Universa Investments L.P., which bases many of its strategies on themes in the book, including how to reap big rewards in a sharp market downturn. Like October’s.

Separate funds in Universa’s so-called Black Swan Protection Protocol were up by a range of 65% to 115% in October, according to a person close to the fund. “We’re discovering the fragility of the financial system,” said Mr. Taleb, who says he expects market volatility to continue as more hedge funds run into trouble.

However, Black Swans are not necessarily bad. Rather, they are highly improbable, often for the better. Taleb writes:

Think about the “secret recipe” to making a killing in the restaurant business. If it were known and obvious then someone next door would have already come up with the idea and it would have become generic. The next killing in the restaurant industry needs to be an idea that is not easily conceived of by the current population of restaurateurs. It has to be at some distance from expectations. The more unexpected the success of such a venture, the smaller the number of competitors, and the more successful the entrepreneur who implements the idea. The same applies to the shoe and the book businesses-or any kind of entrepreneurship. The same applies to scientific theories-nobody has interest in listening to trivialities. The payoff of a human venture is, in general, inversely proportional to what it is expected to be.


Wall Street is predicated on understanding probability. Every financial model makes ostensibly “reasonable” assumptions about the future, firmly grounded in probabilities. The less probable an event, the riskier it is, and the greater a premium for investing in it. Again, this swings in both directions: greater risk means a greater likelihood that you will make money, along with a greater likelihood you will lose it.

But there are some things that are so unlikely, they literally break the model.

Suppose there is a 90% chance that you will earn 20% on an investment, but a 10% chance you will lose it all. If you planned to invest $100, the expected return would be calculated as such:

($100 x 1.2) x 0.9 + ($100 x 0) x 0.1

= $120 x 0.9 + $0 x 0.1

= $108

Your expected return is $108. It’s a good investment, even if you might lose it all.

Now, what if your likelihood of success was 99.999%, but if the investment failed, you would lose $1 billion?

($100 x 1.2) x 0.99999 + ($100 x -10000000) x 0.00001

= $120 x 0.99999 + -$1,000,000,000 x .00001

= -$9,880.00

It’s a bad investment. The potential damage from the investment going wrong overwhelms the upside, even though the investment will in all likelihood not go wrong.

The problem is that all investments have the potential of going catastrophically wrong. What if the US defaults on its debt? What if there is a terrorist attack? What if? What if? Any model that properly accounted for every risk would be unworkable.

So the extreme events are ignored. That investment I just calculated? It’s expected return is modeled as $119.988. It’s not as if the 0.0001 is actually going to happen. It’s a Black Swan.


Apple has released three major products in the last 12 years: the iPod, the iPhone and the iPad. Each created a new market, and made Apple the most profitable company in the world. To Wall Street, such success is arbitrary. Sometimes a company happens on a hit, usually they don’t. Very rarely do they have two, and three is a .001% chance.

Apple’s string of success is effectively impossible. Yet it happened. They are a Black Swan.

Look at Taleb’s criteria:

  • It is an outlier — check
  • It carries an extreme impact — check
  • It is explained after the fact — in the case of Apple, the explanation is Steve Jobs. He was a genius, and now he is gone

And so, AAPL continues its downward descent; it was great to ride it on the upside, but now that Apple is a normal company, the probability of another hit are so remote, it’s best to assume it simply won’t happen.

This is the disconnect many of us in the blogosphere have with Wall Street. We actually believe that design matters, that taste is objective, and that culture can be developed. And, by definition, none of these can be measured or quantified — or modeled.

I’ll close with the same conclusion I wrote for “Apple and the Innovator’s Dilemma,” which examined in detail Apple’s approach. I think it’s apt:

Many will…despair at ever having a Steve Jobs run their company. But I believe that for all of Jobs brilliance, the secret of Appleʼs success is about design and a different way of thinking. Design at its essence, is not just about form, and not just about function. Instead, itʼs both, and more. It is ultimately about the user and delivering exactly what they need, not just what they say they want. Apple takes it as their responsibility — what customers pay them for — to both know technology and customers better than customers know themselves and deliver products that truly surprise and delight. And it is suprise and delight that builds a powerful and long-lasting brand that goes from success to success without any dilemma at all.

Moreover, it is a way of thinking that Apple does not have a monopoly over. It requires acknowledging that there are product attributes that cannot be measured, and that value means much more than money. It also requires thoughtfulness and patience, and a broad appreciation of people and culture. Escaping the Innovatorʼs Dilemma is about escaping the operational mindset that is the current ideal in much of business. In short, there are few other companies like Apple because no one dares or is allowed to think different, not because it is impossible.

But it is rare. Rare like a Black Swan.


  1. Strangely enough, it is always financially advisable for U.S. corporations to take on debt for tax reasons 

  2. Update 5/15/2013: Obviously some of this has since changed; Apple took on debt, bought back stock, and increased their dividend. The broader point still holds 

A Common Thread

Asymco:

The Windows PC market is contracting. The market data has been showing unit shipment declining for some time with the latest quarter having perhaps the steepest decline for two decades.

What remains undocumented however is how the market looks when considering economic value. A more complete picture would be to show revenues, average selling price (or revenue/unit), operating margins/unit and percent of profit capture.

The resulting picture…

PC Unit, Revenue, and Profit Shares
PC Unit, Revenue, and Profit Shares –
Asymco

…looks a lot like this one:

Mobile Unit, Revenue, Profit Shares - Benedict Evans
Mobile Unit, Revenue, Profit Shares – Benedict Evans

Software differentiates hardware. It’s the biggest reason the iPhone is not the Model T.

Facebook Thinks You Might Like Up to Three Video Ads in Your News Feed Each Day

Delightful headline-writing by The Verge. From the article:

Expected to launch in the summer, Facebook’s new video ad units may prove to be a revenue success for the company, but they may also become another nuisance for users. According to AdAge, Facebook is currently in talks with various agencies to secure its first video ad partners ahead of a June/July launch, with a view to displaying three video advertisements in users’ News Feeds each day.

AdAge reports that Facebook is currently selling four daily video ad slots, splitting demographics into four categories: women over 30, women under 30, men over 30, and men under 30. The ads are reportedly priced at around $1 million, suggesting that Facebook could make as much as $4 million a day — if all of its advertising inventory is purchased.

The rub, of course, is that no one wants video ads – or ads on their lock screen, for that matter. But Facebook has no choice: they are an advertising company, and for understandable reasons. Advertising is how consumer-centric web properties monetize.

Facebook is, famously, pivoting to mobile. As Shery’s Sandberg tells the BBC:

“To say that mobile is important to Facebook is the under-exaggeration of all time,” she told us. For the first time last quarter, users had spent more time with Facebook on their mobile phones than on the desktop.

She admitted that the company had been late to get its mobile operation right and had made plenty of mistakes. The firm got underway in 2004 just before the mobile internet revolution took off – Mr Zuckerberg has said if it had been a couple of years later, he would have started it as an app – and the transition over the past year had not been painless.

Here’s the million dollar question: if Facebook had started as an app, what would their business model be?

One of the advantages OTT messaging services have over Facebook on mobile is that their monetization strategies enhance the user experience; Facebook’s detracts. From my piece comparing Facebook to LINE:

LINE comes with a default pack of stickers, and the characters in that default pack are quickly becoming iconic in many Asian countries; however, you can buy new sticker packs for $1.99 using in-app purchase.

Advertising is tolerable on PC’s because there is screenspace to spare; not so on mobile. LINE’s monetization model enhances the the user experience (more stickers!); Facebook’s detracts. Moreover, the fact that LINE is a much smaller company means their revenue needs are much lower.

Facebook can pivot its product all it wants, but it is stuck with the advertising business model. Ultimately, they are in an arms race to provide features so compelling that users will put up with ever increasing irritation.

The Facebook First at the AT&T Store

I paid a visit to my local AT&T store1 on the occasion of the Facebook First being officially available for sell. There was more promotion than I expected, including a dedicated installation and a huge promotional banner behind the counter. That said, there wasn’t really any effort by the salespeople to push me on the phone, although I didn’t ask for any help.

Facebook displays in the AT&T Store
Facebook displays in the AT&T Store

A few observations:

  • Thank goodness the First comes in colors, because the black version is the most boring phone I’ve seen, well, maybe ever. It really looks like a prototype. I know reviewers have compared it to the iPhone 3GS, but the matte finish and dull color on the black First feels cheap and imprecise. Fortunately, the material and finish work much better on the color models, particularly the baby blue; in fact, the baby blue version was one of the better looking phones in the entire store.
  • The transition between the Facebook skin and the default Android interface was jarring; I seemed to trigger it regularly by hitting the “Home” button and it threw me for a loop every time.
  • Chatheads seems like it could be incredibly useful. The pain of maintaining a messaging conversation while simultaneously using one’s phone is significant. I could absolutely see myself favoring Facebook messaging over other OTT alternatives were I using an Android phone.

“Seems” is important though, and speaks to a significant challenge facing the Facebook First in particular: the personalized nature of Facebook Home does not translate to a retail experience. Thus:

  • It’s really hard to understand how Chatheads work without, you know, actually chatting with someone.
  • Cover Feed in the store is nothing more than mind-numbing stock photos; what does it look like with my friends?
  • One of my favorite features of iOS is the lock screen notifications; the First seems to offer something similar, but I never saw a notification in the store.

Anecdotally, my wife, a massive Facebook user, barely interacted with the demo unit; I had to explain why she might care.

There are no easy solutions, although Facebook could be doing more.

  • There should be an online demo where you create your Facebook Home experience, complete with your personalized cover feed, Chathead implementation, and notifications. Windows Phone, which faces similar challenges in marketing itself as a personalized device, has tried to do something along those lines. Facebook can and should do better.
  • Facebook should build a demo routine into the First that simulates using Chatheads to message. This could go the extreme of having customer service representatives actually chat with you – which Apple did with Facetime when it launched – but more realistically could be an on-device automated demo.
  • There needs to be a clear articulation of the value Facebook Home is providing to customers; there literally was nothing more in the store beyond a couple of pretty pictures.

As noted, I never spoke to a salesperson, but I’m not optimistic they could have effectively alleviated these issues, particularly when it comes to personalization.

More broadly,

  • Selling things is hard. It’s all fine and dandy to rely on word of mouth when your product is free, but expecting people to part with cash requires a clear articulation of value; Facebook hasn’t even put in a rudimentary effort here.
  • Selling items based on their ability to be “personal” is even harder. The HTC First without my Facebook information is worse than meaningless; it’s boring (and the industrial design does not help).2
  • The ability to sell effectively should be viewed as a massive competitive advantage.

To this last point: I would argue that Apple’s retail stores, appreciated as they are, are in fact undervalued. They are arguably Apple’s most unassailable3 competitive advantage.4 Those 300+ locations are a type of refinery, taking the crudeness of bullets on a web page and transforming them into essential, must-have products that fuel customer purchase.

Of course Facebook is far from having their own retail presence; what’s worrying is that the complete absence of an articulated value proposition or online demo suggest they don’t even know how far behind they are.


A couple more photos of note:

Left: The iPhone installation. Right: The HTC One.
Left: The iPhone installation. Right: The HTC One.
  • The Facebook installation was roughly the same size as that for the iPhone
  • The HTC One was completely buried amidst a bunch of no-name phones. Not good.

  1. It was a company store in Bellevue Square Mall 

  2. I wonder how much this impacts Windows Phone as well 

  3. Look at how long it has taken Microsoft to build out a tenth of the locations 

  4. Another candidate: seated wallets, although here Amazon is closer 

The Week in Review – April 6-13, 2013

It was a week of beginnings and endings.

The iPhone launched on T-Mobile on Friday to lines nearly everywhere, although they quickly dissipated. There seems little reason to doubt the iPhone will soon be more that 50% of T-Mobile smartphone sales, just like the other major carriers. More pointedly, it seems increasingly clear that limited carrier distribution of the iPhone was the most significant factor in Android’s past success in the U.S; the rest of the world, where an iPhone 5 costs $600, not $200, remains a different story.

The Facebook First also began sales on AT&T, albeit without lines. I went to check it out and will have a brief report early next week. Facebook Home also launched on Android Play to middling reviews; do users know what they’re getting into? Both angles actually makes one more bullish on Apple: one of their most important competitive advantages is retail and the direct connection they enjoy with regular consumers.

On the other side of the spectrum, IDC announced that PC Sales had plummeted by 14%, double the 7% predicted. It seems there are three significant reasons why:

  1. PC’s have long since become good enough from a performance perspective. There is no compelling reason to upgrade
  2. The iPad does many of the jobs PC’s were previously hired to do more effectively, eating into time spent on PCs and PC-buying budgets
  3. Windows 8 may disincentivize traditional PC users from upgrading, while not yet offering a compelling alternative to iPad use cases

I didn’t write more about this report, largely because it feels like it’s been coming for a long time. Two key pieces:

The reason this matters is that the vast majority of users are primarily content consumers. These are the people buying netbooks as their primary computers, or simply avoiding computers as much as possible. They simply want to go on Facebook, check their email, watch YouTube, and at most, upload pictures. Apple’s value proposition to these customers is: The iPad is a superior content consumption experience with sufficient creation capabilities to meet your needs.

It is not so much a computer as it is an appliance, significantly better at some use cases – reading, drawing, playing games – and significantly worse at others – writing, organizing, editing. In this way it began the disaggregation of personal computing. Instead of using one device for all of our computing needs, we used two. True, you can use the iPad as your only computing device, but most don’t; they simply keep their old laptop a little bit longer than they would have otherwise, and use both.

Here on stratechery I wrote three articles and five linked-list items; this felt much more balanced and sustainable than last week’s madness. Moreover, I’m pushing to make the linked-list items clearly pertinent to the themes I’m focused on here at stratechery, and more substantive than simply pull quotes. They’re arguably articles in their own right, just of a different style. I trust you find them useful.

As always, I greatly appreciate your spreading the word about stratechery and following @stratechery.

Articles | Linked List Items | Other Links Worth Reading

Continue reading “The Week in Review – April 6-13, 2013”

Apple, Samsung, and the Parable of the Model-T

Steve Jobs was famously fond of the Henry Ford adage:

“If I had asked people what they wanted, they would have said faster horses.”

It’s true! New products – new categories – require vision and an unflinching focus on the job to be done (i.e. transport), not simply enhancing or extending solutions that already exist (i.e. horses).

So it was with the iPhone. Instead of creating a better phone, Apple created a pocket-sized computer that accomplished multiple jobs; the addition of the app store extended exponentially the potential jobs that could be done by an iPhone.

But the story of Henry Ford didn’t end with the Model T.


Henry Ford didn’t invent the car. Instead, he made it accessible, reliable, and affordable.

He was able to do so by being vertically integrated: raw materials ranging from rubber to iron ore would enter Ford’s massive 100,000 employee complex on one end, Model T’s on the other – 15.5 million in all.

Each one was painted black.

“Any customer can have a car painted any color that he wants as long as it is black.”

Ford’s snark notwithstanding, there was a legitimate reason for the lack of color: given the speed with which Model T’s flew off Ford’s assembly lines, paint simply took too long to dry; Ford instead used a black enamel that could be baked on.

In many respects, this focus on on the efficiency of production was admirable; Ford lowered the price of a Model T from $880 at its 1908 launch to a mere $290 in 1924. But it was in 1924 that Ford’s sales peaked.

In Denial: Why Business Leaders Fail to Look Facts in the Face–and What to Do About It Richard Tedlow writes:

Henry Ford began his business career with a sharp focus on customer benefit. By putting America on wheels, he liberated a nation from the tyranny of distance. During the 1920s, his focus shifted from making customers happy to making more Model T’s.

It turns out customers wanted colors, but Ford didn’t care. His production process was more important.

GM cared. They figured out colors, and they figured out brands. They figured out that cars were a status symbol, highly individualistic, and aspirational. Your car is on display everywhere you go, and it says something about your place in life. So GM made cars in every color, and created brands “for every purse and purpose.” They also introduced the idea of the annual refresh, with the assumption it would drive demand. And starting in 1924, they began to take over the market.

Ford would only outsell GM three times in the next 80 years.


Today Samsung announced the Galaxy Mega. The Twitter snark was strong.

All right — I’ll be the one to say it: “Samsung, please: Stop the madness” – @jr_raphael

New from Samsung. Galaxy Waffle Iron. – @JohnPaczkowski

I am waiting for Samsung’s Ultra Mega. I want to wear it over my eyes like an Oculus Rift and just walk into things while I text. – @tomwarren

But no one was re-tweeted more than Derek Kessler:

Of course, Samsung sells more smartphones than anyone. Turns out customers want different sizes.


And now for the caveat: Samsung leads the way in units, but not profits. That’s fair, and Apple is in a much stronger position than Ford was in 1924. Ford’s problem was that they primarily appealed to first-time car buyers; Apple’s ecosystem advantage means they’re much more likely to retain current customers.

Still, the idea that Ford became overly focused on production as opposed to customer needs is a worrying one; if this fall brings nothing more than a 5S, with the same form factor as the 5, well, that will be great for production costs, but not so great for customers who prefer a larger phone, or a cheaper one (and remember, Cook is a production guy, not a product one).

It’s not 1908, and it’s not 2007. I hope for Apple’s sake it’s not 1924.

The Samsung Mega

Stefan Constantinescu:

The long rumored Samsung Galaxy Mega product family has just been made official. As expected, there are two devices in the Mega portfolio, the Mega 5.8 and the Mega 6.3. Starting with the larger model, it has a 6.3 inch 720p TFT display, a dual core 1.7 GHz processor, 1.5 GB of RAM, an 8 megapixel camera, and a massive 3,200 mAh battery. In terms of dimensions, SamMobile nailed them: 88 mm × 167.6 mm × 8.0 mm. The whole thing weighs 199 grams.

Yes, this is going to look ridiculous, but we said that about the Note as well. Turns out there is a significant market, particularly in Asia. Two points:

  • These phablets (embrace the name, people) provide a really great experience with many of the new OTT messaging apps, such as LINE. In Asia, LINE et al are the primary means of communication (not voice).
  • In countries without a carrier subsidization model, buying both a phone and tablet is much more cost prohibitive; it makes financial sense to buy just one device that serves both functions:

    Carrier-subsidized country (such as the US): High-end phone = $199, Tablet = $299

    Non-subsidized country (including much of Asia): High-end = $599, Tablet = $299, Phablet = $599

In the long run, phablets are a much greater threat to iPads than are Android tablets.

Line Enters E-book Business With Line Manga

TechInAsia:

Line Corporation popular messaging app, Line, has launched Line Manga yesterday. Line Manga is an extended service and a separate app from Line messaging app which allows users to read manga while on the move available both on iOS and Android. The launch brings 30,000 comics to Line’s 120 million users with popular titles such as One Piece and Dragonball available for downloads.

Users can choose to share comics on their timeline to receive 10 Line Coins per day.

One of LINE’s advantages over PC-based social networks is that it can build a platform on top of existing app stores. In this case, LINE will sell manga (and, in the future, all types of media) via in-app purchase, and then cross-promote that purchase into the LINE messaging app.

Social networks that originated on PC’s – Facebook specifically – are already tied in to their own monetization system (e.g. Facebook credits). Facebook can’t not use Facebook Credits, but Apple at least won’t let Facebook use Facebook credits in their mobile app.

This is just one of several handicaps Facebook faces vis a vis purely mobile competitors. Facebook has to make their business fit on mobile, both figuratively and literally; LINE et al are fully native, from design to business model.

Huawei, MediaTek, and the Lower Right

Stefan Constantinescu:

Huawei is a Chinese network infrastructure vendor that once made cheap phones for operators, but then they decided to pull an HTC and promote their own brand. The company has had a lot of success, no one is denying that, but they’re not growing as fast as they’d like.

Huawei repeatedly said they had a goal of shipping 60 million smartphones during calendar 2012, but it looks like they only managed to ship 32 million.

Like HTC, Huawei is stuck in the lower left corner:

Sustainable Competitive Advantages
Sustainable Competitive Advantages

There is nothing about their phones is unique from a product standpoint, and the brand is far inferior to Samsung’s. As Constantinescu notes:

If you’re living in China, and you know that being seen with a Samsung phone will make people believe you’re financially well off, why would you buy a Chinese phone that looks like a cheap knock off?

This is spot-on, and really highlight Samsung’s strategy: the Galaxy S series and its associated marketing enhances the brand to the benefit of their low-cost models.

Meanwhile, truly cheap smartphones are increasingly dominated by MediaTek, the Taiwanese baseband provider. The most recent newsletter from Jay Goldberg has an extensive overview, and is very much worth a read. A snippet:

Mediatek created a new business model for the cell phone industry. They recognized that their traditional customers had very limited engineering talent. These were typically companies with a few assembly lines capable of putting chips on a board and wrapping that board in plastic. None of these companies had the ability to design cellular phone software or build pretty user interfaces. These companies relied on their chip suppliers to provide basic software like device drivers and user interfaces. So Mediatek took all that software work and bundled it into a complete package which they called a reference design for mobile phones.

Mediatek builds hundreds of millions of these reference designs that end up as $60 smartphones. Nominally Android, but with a plethora of Chinese services on top.